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 Presidential Pardon in
Singapore: A Comment on
Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-
General
Shubhankar Dam*
Abstract: This paper critically analyses the decision of the Singapore
Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General in relation to
presidential pardon. Two questions were central to the case. First, is the
President bound by the decision of the Cabinet in pardon-related mat-
ters? Secondly, are decisions regarding pardon—whether made by the
Cabinet or President—subject to judicial review? In relation to the first
question, the Court based its reasoning on Singapore’s political system
being a Westminster-inspired model and, therefore, that the President
generally undertakes the same functions as the British monarch. How-
ever, this paper identifies the unique features of Singapore’s presidency,
and argues that the British model does not act as an adequate starting
point with regard to the issue of discretion. With regard to the second
question, the Court of Appeal held that decisions on pardons are subject
to judicial review not on their merits, but only in relation to procedural
inadequacies. The paper, however, suggests that the Court’s conclusions
are inconsistent: either decisions to grant or refuse pardons can be
reviewed on their merits, or the suggested grounds of review must be
revised.
Keywords: Singapore, President, pardon, discretion, judicial review
I. Introduction
Singapore’s President may grant pardons, reprieves, respites and re-
missions under Article 22P of the Constitution of the Republic of
Singapore (hereinafter ‘Singapore Constitution’). In doing so, must
the President necessarily act on the advice of the Cabinet, or does he
or she have discretion in deciding the matter? If so, is that discretion
subject to judicial review? The Court of Appeal in the Republic of
Singapore was confronted with these questions in Yong Vui Kong v
Attorney-General (‘Pardon Case’).1 In November 2008, Yong Vui Kong,
* Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University School of Law; e-mail:
Shubhankard@smu.edu.sg. I am grateful to Chandra Mohan for his comments on
an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 [2011] SGCA 9.
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a Malaysian teenager, was found guilty of trafficking just under 50
grams of diamorphine into Singapore and sentenced to death by
hanging.2 Subsequently, Yong petitioned President S.R. Nathan for
clemency; this was refused. Four days before the execution was to be
carried out, he filed another appeal, arguing that the provision under
the drugs law that mandatorily imposes the death penalty was uncon-
stitutional. In Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor (‘Death Penalty
Case’),3 Yong’s argument on this issue was rejected. Prior to the ruling
in the Death Penalty Case, Minister of Law K. Shanmugam publicly
stated that the death penalty was justified in the case on grounds of
public safety;4 sparing the accused from the death penalty, the Minis-
ter claimed, would encourage drug barons to use vulnerable traf-
fickers as mules.5 It was against the backdrop of such comments made
by the Minister of Law that Yong argued before the High Court, and
later the Court of Appeal, in the Pardon Case, that pardon decisions
must be made independently by the President and that such decisions
are subject to judicial review.
II. Elected President and Discretionary Powers
Article 22P of the Singapore Constitution states that ‘The President, as
occasion shall arise, may, on the advice of the Cabinet, grant a par-
don’.6 Relying on the word ‘may’, counsel for Yong, M. Ravi, argued
that the President has authority to make an independent decision on a
mercy petition and is not bound by the advice of the Cabinet.
Article 21 of the Singapore Constitution—which extensively lists
the powers of the President—does four things. First, on one extreme,
is the general rule that unless otherwise provided for, a President
must act on the advice of the Cabinet.7 Secondly, on the other ex-
treme, are matters on which the President has personal discretion.
Article 21(2) lists eight such specific matters and a final open-ended
one: the President has personal discretion in performing ‘any other
function’ authorized by the Singapore Constitution. Between these
extremes of complete dependence and independence lie two ‘con-
sultative’ requirements. Under Article 21(3), the President must con-
sult the Council of Presidential Advisers before performing functions
2 Public Prosecutor v Yong Vui Kong [2009] SGHC 4. The defendant was convicted
under the provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973, cap. 185 (2008 rev. edn),
which imposes the mandatory death penalty for certain categories of offences.
3 [2010] 3 Singapore Law Reports.
4 Zakir Hussain, ‘Tough stance on serious crimes saves lives: Minister’, The Straits
Times, 10 May 2010.
5 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 5.
6 Singapore Constitution (1999 reprint), Article 22P (emphasis added).
7 Singapore Constitution, Article 21(1).
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specifically provided for.8 Finally, under Article 21(4), the Council may
be consulted in performing some of the independent functions pro-
vided for in Article 21(2). The President, in other words, has both
dependent and independent powers. While dependent powers, by
definition, must be exercised in accordance with the Cabinet’s advice,
the independent powers are of two kinds. The first kind involves
matters where the President must act without Cabinet (or other) ad-
vice. The second kind refers to matters which are initially decided by
the Cabinet but require the President’s independent approval. This
latter kind of independent (approving) power falls into two further
categories: matters on which the President must consult with the
Council, and matters on which the Council may be consulted.
In relation to the power to grant pardons, Yong argued that the
open-ended Article 21(2) (i) (‘The President may act in his discretion in
the performance of . . . any other function’) read together with Article
22P (‘The President . . . may, on the advice of the Cabinet, grant a
pardon’) suggests that the President is not bound by the Cabinet’s
advice in such matters. While the Cabinet is authorized to take a call,
the President is not bound by such advice. Andrew Phang and V.K.
Rajah JJ rejected this argument on the grounds that the power to
grant pardons was simply of the ‘dependent’ variety. They based their
decision on the wording of Article 22P, its legislative history, relevant
case law and the nature of Singapore’s presidency. In the opinion of
the author, however, these interpretative limbs, both individually and
collectively, point to the opposite conclusion.
For example, interpreting ‘on the advice of the Cabinet’ in Article
22P(1) in the light of the words ‘act in accordance with the advice of
the Cabinet’ in Article 21(1), the judges concluded that the President
has no discretion under the former provision.9 However, a compar-
ison of the two provisions would suggest otherwise. Article 21(1)
requires the President to act ‘in accordance with’ the advice of the
Cabinet. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary states that to act ‘in
accordance with’ something is to act ‘in a manner conforming with’.10
This implies that in exercising power under Article 21(1), the President
must act in conformity with the advice of the Cabinet: he or she must
do as the Cabinet wishes. Article 22P, however, requires that the Pres-
ident may act ‘on the advice of the Cabinet’. Given the distinct phras-
eology, ‘on’ in Article 22P can only function as a preposition, and refer
to the time at which the President must act. He or she may act on the
8 This Council is a constitutional body under Article 37B of the Singapore
Constitution. It comprises six members, of whom two are appointed by the
President, two are appointed by the Prime Minister, while the Chief Justice and the
Chairman of the Public Service Commission appoint one member each.
9 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 157.
10 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 12th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2011).
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advice of the Cabinet, that is, on receiving advice from the Cabinet.
The judges, therefore, were correct to compare the two provisions—
Article 21(1) and Article 22P—but were mistaken in concluding that
they mean the same thing. Clearly, they do not: Article 21(1) refers to
the manner in which discretion must be exercised; Article 22P refers
to the point in time when it may be exercised.
The judges also claimed that the word ‘may’ in Article 22P does not
‘connote a personal discretion . . . to reject the advice of the Cab-
inet’.11 Such a conclusion would render the Cabinet’s advice ‘point-
less’.12 The logic here is hard to follow. As previously stated, the
President must consult the Council of Presidential Advisers on several
matters listed in Article 21(3). Such consultation is not rendered point-
less merely because the President may reject the Council’s advice, any
more than decisions of the High Court are rendered pointless because
the Court of Appeal may overturn them. Thus, the advice of the Cab-
inet does not become pointless merely because the President has the
power to act in a contrary way. Simply put, in pardon-related matters
the Cabinet and the President have a shared role. The Cabinet decides
at the first instance, and the President reconsiders the issue in the
light of the former’s advice.
Andrew Phang and V.K. Rajah JJ also summoned a large body of
historical materials to make the case against presidential discretion.
Their principal emphasis was on the Republic of Singapore Independ-
ence Act 1965 (RSIA),13 and, in particular, s. 8 thereof (a provision that
is textually identical to Article 22P). When the RSIA was debated in
Parliament, the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, commented that
the provision ‘invests the power of pardon [i]n the President who will
exercise it in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet’.14 To the
judges, Lee’s comments suggested ‘that Art 22P excludes any role for
the President’s personal discretion’.15 The argument may be re-
phrased thus: Article 22P is a verbatim reproduction of RSIA, s. 8.
While debating this latter provision, Lee stated that decisions regard-
ing pardons will actually be made by the Cabinet. The power in
Article 22P must, therefore, be understood similarly. The author be-
lieves that this argument is also mistaken. Important as they are,
Prime Minister Lee’s words in Parliament are not—and cannot be—
dispositive of what a constitutional provision means. While Singa-
pore’s Interpretation Act 1965,16 s. 9A authorizes courts to consider,
11 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 157.
12 Ibid.
13 Act 9 of 1965.
14 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 172 (emphasis in the original).
15 Ibid.
16 Act 10 of 1965 (rev. edn 2002).
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among other things, ‘relevant material in any official record of de-
bates in Parliament’, this reasoning does not take into account the
context of the written law.17
Today, Singapore’s constitutional arrangement is significantly dif-
ferent from the one in existence when Prime Minister Lee commented
on RSIA in 1965. At that time, because Singapore had a typical West-
minster system with a titular head of state and a powerful head of
government, Presidents (or the equivalent) followed the instructions
of Cabinets. However, since 1991, the President is far from being
titular: the presidency is now a nationally and directly elected office
with constitutionally guaranteed powers.18 The President has, as pre-
viously mentioned, a range of independent functions, and more im-
portantly, a degree of electoral legitimacy, which could not have been
claimed back in 1965. Presidential independence may have been
democracy-usurping back then; it is potentially democracy-enabling
today. Moreover, with the new and enhanced role of the President, it
is now possible to identify the precise limits of presidential powers.
Article 22P and RSIA, s. 8 are textually similar, but it is the context that
sets them apart. While the lengthy historical explorations make for
interesting reading, they are entirely irrelevant to the question at
hand. The judges, the author contends, erred in deciding to base their
reasoning on a historical analysis.
The judges reviewed the White Papers produced in the years lead-
ing up to the elected presidency, noting the list of discretionary
powers mentioned therein; however, in doing so they overlooked the
very provision which made their argument untenable. A 1988 White
Paper, for example, claimed that the President’s discretionary powers
were meant to enable him or her to ‘[protect] the Republic’s financial
assets, and [preserve] the integrity of the public services’.19 A later one
expanded on this by listing seven specific matters on which the Pres-
ident was to have independent authority. The power to grant pardons
was, however, ‘conspicuously absent from [this] list of personal dis-
cretionary powers’.20 This absence led the judges to the conclusion
that the President has no discretion in pardon matters. It is important
to note that Andrew Phang and V.K. Rajah JJ at this point were
relying on the White Papers, but ignoring Article 21(2). This latter
provision lists nine matters on which the President has discretion,
17 For commentary on s. 9A, see Brady Coleman Jr, ‘Effect of Section 9A of the
Interpretation Act on Statutory Interpretation in Singapore’ (2000) 40 Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 152.
18 Singapore Constitution, Article 17(2). Prior to 1991, presidents were indirectly
elected by Parliament. See Kevin Tan and Peng Er Lam, Managing Political Change
in Singapore: The Elected Presidency (Routledge: Singapore, 1997).
19 Constitutional Amendments to Safeguard the Financial Assets and the Integrity of
the Public Services, Cmd 10 of 1988.
20 See Constitutional Amendments to Safeguard the Financial Assets and the
Integrity of Public Services: The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore
(Amendment No. 3) Bill, Cmd 11 of 1990.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
52
 
by
 g
ue
st
 o
n 
M
ar
ch
 2
7,
 2
01
5
cl
w
.s
ag
ep
ub
.c
om
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 
including a final open-ended one under which he or she may perform
‘any other function’ authorized by the Singapore Constitution. White
Papers are preparatory materials, and though important, cannot act
as a substitute for constitutional provisions. It is also worth emphasiz-
ing that, contrary to the judges’ claim, not all discretionary functions
of the President relate to ‘protecting Singapore’s financial assets or
preserving the integrity of the public services’.21 The appointment of
the Prime Minister and matters relating to emergencies and deten-
tions under extraordinary legislation are obvious examples.22 Indeed,
there is nothing in Article 21 to suggest that the President’s discre-
tionary jurisdiction pertains exclusively to Singapore’s finances or
public services. To impose such a requirement is to amend the presid-
ency, not interpret it.
Foreign precedents, especially Indian ones, were the last limb of the
argument that led the Court of Appeal to conclude that the President
has no discretion in pardon matters. In Maru Ram v Union of India,23
the Indian Supreme Court, in assessing pardon provisions, held that
‘the President and the Governor, be they ever so high in textual termi-
nology, are but functional euphemisms promptly acting on and only on
the advice of the Council of Ministers’.24 This proposition, the Court of
Appeal claimed, is ‘elementary constitutional law that any student of
the subject must know’ and equally applicable to Singapore.25 The
matter, however, is hardly free from doubt. It is not clear that the
Indian decisions were themselves correct, and even if they were, In-
dia’s muddled constitutional praxis is hardly a guide worthy of im-
port. In India, principles, politics and precedents coalesce in
seemingly incongruous and contradictory ways in order to make the
system work. One example, in the context of pardon power, suffices to
make the point. There is, as we have seen, clear dicta that pardon-
related decisions are in practice made by the Council of Ministers.
And yet, as recently as June 2011, India’s Home Minister, P.C. Chidam-
baram, was emphatic—when responding to questions about the per-
ceived delay on the mercy petition of Afzal Guru, who had been
convicted of attacking India’s Parliament House in December
200126—that such decisions are the prerogative of the President.27
Objecting to the idea that such decisions be made in a time-bound
manner, Chidambaram said: ‘I cannot give a time frame. My duty is to
21 See Public Prosecutor v Yong Vui Kong, n. 2 above at 179.
22 Singapore Constitution, Article 21(1)(g).
23 AIR [1980] SC 2147.
24 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 61 (emphasis in the original).
25 See ibid. at 177.
26 Anon, ‘Govt says it’s waiting for President’s decision on Afzal Guru’, NDTV News,
13 December 2011, available at: http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/govt-says-its-
waiting-for-presidents-decision-on-afzal-guru-157709 (accessed 8 June 2012).
27 Anon, ‘Prez to decide on Afzal Guru's mercy plea’, Indian Express, 2 July 2011,
available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/videos/national/6/prez-to-decide-on-
afzal-gurus-mercy-plea/5193 (accessed 8 June 2012).
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resubmit cases and it is for the President to take a decision’.28 These
uncontested comments are, in many ways, representative of how
India works: there is law, and then there is practice. While reasons for
this law–practice split are complicated, in the context of pardons, they
are easily explained. Guru’s mercy petition became ‘political’ in India.
There are those who wish to see the death penalty promptly carried
out.29 To some, the Cabinet’s refusal to make a prompt recommenda-
tion is part of a political conspiracy to endear itself to some of India’s
religious minorities. Then there are those—terrorist organizations
specifically—who have threatened to unleash violence if Guru is ex-
ecuted. Either way, a decision on Guru’s mercy petition may be costly.
Kicking the pardon-can to the President, therefore, is one way of
insulating the Cabinet from any fall-out. The President is largely seen
as a non-partisan authority, and unsavoury criticism is unlikely no
matter which way the axe falls.
None the less, the Court of Appeal’s uncritical reliance on Indian
precedents is a pleasant departure from its usual practice of making
comparative references only to explain why such precedents are inap-
plicable to the ‘local context’.30 The Death Penalty Case is a classic
example. In 2010, the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty
in Singapore was challenged on the ground that international con-
sensus overwhelmingly pointed to the conclusion that such provisions
are both cruel and unconstitutional. However, the Court of Appeal
rejected that argument on the grounds that Singapore’s constitutional
provisions were ‘different’.31 And yet, when the Court of Appeal en-
countered a presidency that was genuinely unique—a classic local-
context-is-different case—it paid no heed to those differences except
for some perfunctory references.
What makes Singapore’s presidency different is that—contrary to
arrangements that are common in many Westminster systems—the
President neither inherits the role nor is appointed.32 Rather, the Pres-
ident is directly elected by a national vote. Indeed, the President is the
only nationally elected office and, therefore, has a kind of superior
legitimacy. The President can speak on behalf of ‘the people’ in a way
28 Anon, ‘Report on Afzal Guru case not yet sent to President: Chidambaram’, Jagran
Post, 1 June 2011, available at: http://post.jagran.com/Report-on-Afzal-Guru-case-
not-yet-sent-to-President-Chidambaram-1306940872 (accessed 8 June 2012).
29 Anon, ‘BJP presses for Afzal Guru's hanging’, Times of India, 28 May 2011,
available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-28/india/
29594437_1_mercy-petitions-afzal-guru-review-petition (accessed 8 June 2012). 
30 See Arun Thiruvengadam, ‘Comparative law and constitutional interpretation:
Insights From Constitutional Theory’ in Thio Li-ann and Kevin YL Tan (eds),
Evolution of a Revolution: Forty years of the Singapore Constitution (Routledge:
London, 2009) 113.
31 [2010] 3 Singapore Law Reports. Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, ‘The Mandatory Death Penalty
and a Sparsely Worded Constitution’ (2011) 127 LQR 192.
32 Wan Wai Yee, ‘Recent Changes to the Westminster System of Government and
Government Accountability’ (1994) 15 Singapore Law Review 297.
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that no other official or appointee is able to. Furthermore, the discre-
tionary powers of the President are specially protected and cannot be
amended ‘by Parliament unless it has also been supported at a na-
tional referendum by not less than two-thirds of the total number of
votes cast’ by qualified electors.33 In addition, the Singapore Constitu-
tion establishes a range of independent powers for the President;
contrary to other Westminster systems, the powers of Singapore’s
President are not a matter of convention. Taken together, these fea-
tures reveal a significant departure from the Westminster system.34
The Pardon Case, in many respects, related to how local variations
affect the conventional view about the power to grant pardons. By
relying on Westminster axioms and ignoring the local context, the
Court of Appeal avoided the principal question at hand. This perhaps
explains the ease with which the ‘no discretion’ conclusion was
reached. A mere syllogism was sufficient to reach it: in Westminster-
inspired systems, the power to grant pardons is exercised by the
Cabinet or the relevant Ministers; Singapore is a Westminster system,
therefore only the Cabinet can exercise such power. The syllogism is
neat and simple. It is also incorrect.
III. Presidential Pardons and the Review of Discretionary
Power
In addition to the matter of presidential discretion, questions relating
to judicial review were also addressed in the Pardon Case. Article 22P
of the Singapore Constitution provides for two kinds of pardons. The
first kind applies only to accomplices. The President may grant a
pardon to ‘any accomplice in any offence who gives information
which leads to the conviction of the principal offender’.35 This provi-
sion, in other words, may be invoked only where the accomplice
provides information, and the information subsequently leads to the
conviction of the principal offender. The second kind of pardon ap-
plies to any convicted person. The President may grant this ‘to any
offender convicted of any offence in any court in Singapore’.36 The
provision, however, lays out a specific procedure for cases involving
the death penalty. Article 22P(2) requires that judges involved at the
trial and appellate stages of the relevant proceedings make a report to
the President, which the President should then forward to the
Attorney-General for his or her opinion. That opinion, along with
other reports, is then sent to the Cabinet in order that it ‘may advise
33 Singapore Constitution, Article 5A. This provision, though written into the
Constitution in 1991, has not yet been brought into effect. See Constitutional
Reference No. 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 Singapore Law Reports 803.
34 On Westminster models, see Andrew Harding, ‘The “Westminster Model”
Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and Development in
Commonwealth States’ (2004) 4 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 143.
35 Singapore Constitution, Article 22P(1)(a) (emphasis added).
36 Singapore Constitution, Article 22P(1)(b).
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the President on the exercise of the power conferred on him’.37 Rely-
ing on these provisions and applicable precedents, the appellant
argued that pardon-related discretion in Singapore—whether exer-
cised by the President or the Cabinet—is subject to judicial review.
After a lengthy examination of precedents from commonwealth
jurisdictions—including the United Kingdom,38 the Caribbean
States,39 Canada,40 Australia,41 New Zealand,42 India,43 Hong Kong44
and Malaysia45—Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong rejected the argument,
stating that the ‘doctrine of separation of powers’ and ‘established
administrative law principles’ means that the power to grant pardons
‘is not justiciable on the merits’.46 Assuming ‘that the clemency power
is exercised in accordance with law’, the merits of any particular
clemency decision will fall outside the purview of the courts.47 Singa-
pore courts, in other words, will not decide whether a clemency deci-
sion is ‘wise or foolish, harsh or kind’, nor will they ‘substitute their
own decision for the clemency decision made by the President simply
because they disagree with the President’s view on the matter’.48 The
exclusion of judicial review here, however, did not imply that clem-
ency power in the constitutional context was ‘beyond any legal con-
straints or restraints’.49 CJ Chan pointed out three limits on the
exercise of such power; two of these were drawn from precedents. In
Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis,50 it was held that the
discretionary power to prosecute under the Singapore Constitution
was not absolute. The court stated that such prosecutorial discretion
is subject to judicial review ‘if it is exercised in bad faith for an
extraneous purpose’ or if ‘its exercise contravenes constitutional pro-
tections and rights . . . ([including among other things] . . . the equal
protection of law under Art 12 of the Constitution)’.51 CJ Chan held
that these grounds are equally applicable to the review of pardon
37 Singapore Constitution, Article 22P(2) (emphasis added).
38 Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985]
AC 374.
39 Neville Lewis v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50; Thomas
Reckley v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration and Others (No 2) [1996] AC
527.
40 William Colin Thatcher v The Attorney General of Canada and Others [1997] 1 FC
289.
41 Eastman v ACT (2008) 227 FLR 262.
42 Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672.
43 Maru Ram v Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107.
44 Ch’ng Poh v The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
HCAL 182/2002.
45 Juraimi bin Husin v Pardons Board, State of Pahang & Ors [2002] 4 The Malayan
Law Journal 529.
46 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 75 (emphasis in the original).
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. at 76.
50 [2008] 2 Singapore Law Reports (R) 239.
51 Ibid. at 149.
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power.52 However, he also added a third ground, drawn from the
elaborate procedure on death penalty cases in Article 22P itself. He
stated that the procedure ‘necessarily implies . . . a constitutional duty
on the part of the Cabinet to consider those materials impartially and
in good faith’.53 Therefore, where ‘conclusive evidence is produced . . .
to show that the Cabinet never met to consider the offender’s case at
all, or . . . merely tossed a coin . . . the Cabinet would have acted in
breach of Art 22P(2)’.54
This overall position on judicial review of pardons, the author
argues, is internally inconsistent and, legally speaking, untenable.
First, as CJ Chan himself acknowledged, Article 22P makes a distinc-
tion between death penalty and non-death penalty cases. Unlike the
latter, an elaborate procedure is spelt out for the former—one that led
him to hold that the Cabinet has a ‘constitutional duty’ to consider
materials impartially and in good faith. Were this correct, it would
follow that no such duty exists in non-death penalty cases. After all,
there is no procedure mentioned for such cases. Therefore, if the
Cabinet flips a coin to decide the fate of a convict sentenced to life
imprisonment, CJ Chan’s reasoning suggests that no wrong can be
alleged. Surely, such an outcome is inconsistent with any meaningful
understanding of the rule of law that judges aspire to uphold.55
Secondly, CJ Chan concedes that the grant of—or the refusal to
grant—pardons may be reviewed on three grounds. It may be chal-
lenged on the ground of illegality. Under Article 22P(1)(a), the Presid-
ent may pardon an accomplice if his information ‘leads to the
conviction of the principal offender’. If pardoned under this provision,
a victim of the crime, for example, may argue that the pardon is illegal
because the constitutional requirement was not satisfied: information
provided by the accomplice did not lead to the conviction of the
principal offender. It would then be for the President to explain why
the pardon should not be invalidated. A pardon may also be chal-
lenged on the ground that the decision was based on extraneous
reasons; for example, if the President pardoned a convict on the
ground that he or she had generously contributed to the political
party to which members of the Cabinet belonged. Thirdly, CJ Chan
says that a pardon may be challenged on the ground that ‘its exercise
contravenes constitutional protection and rights’. Let us assume that
information provided by two accomplices leads to the conviction of
the principal offenders. While both accomplices apply for a pardon,
only one is granted it. The President, for example, may choose to
selectively grant it because one is a teenager and therefore deserves a
second chance. If the unsuccessful applicant challenged this on the
ground that it infringed his or her right to equal protection of the law,
52 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 80.
53 Ibid. at 82.
54 Ibid. at 83.
55 Ibid.
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the court would have to assess whether the President’s reasons satisfy
the test of equality under the Singapore Constitution.56 However, if
both accomplices are teenagers, the courts will invariably be drawn
into considering the decision on its merits in order to identify why
only one was pardoned. The point of reference here is not the validity
of the overall policy—regarding, say, discrimination based on age—
but the particular facts that distinguish the two teenagers. This
demonstrates that—contrary to the assertion made by CJ Chan—
excluding the merits of a clemency decision cannot be consistently
achieved. If, as CJ Chan says, violation of constitutional protections
and rights is a valid ground on which to challenge a pardon then, by
definition, there will be situations that require the courts to adjudicate
as to whether a decision was ‘wise or foolish, harsh or kind’.57 Both
positions cannot exist concurrently: either pardons are reviewable on
their merits, or constitutional rights are not a ground on which to
challenge such decisions. CJ Chan’s conclusion that the applicant
does not have a right of disclosure seriously undermines his earlier
finding that the power to grant pardons is subject to judicial review.
The appellant argued that he was entitled to the materials that the
Cabinet had relied upon in making its decision. CJ Chan rejected that
argument, concluding that the Privy Council’s decision in Neville
Lewis v Attorney General of Jamaica and another58 was irrelevant to
the ‘local context’59 because Article 22P does not confer a right to
petition for clemency and, therefore, there is no corresponding right
to disclosure of materials.60 He stated that, until the contrary is shown,
courts must proceed on the basis of ‘presumptive legality’, i.e. that
everything has been done in conformity with the law.61
In summary, CJ Chan’s three findings were that: the power to grant
a pardon is subject to judicial review on limited grounds; a convicted
individual who is applying for a pardon has no right to disclosure of
materials, the basis on which the decision is made, and where con-
clusive evidence is adduced to show that the Cabinet never met to
consider the offender’s case, or merely tossed a coin, a court will
invalidate such a decision.62 If the first and second of these are correct
then, by definition, the last is legally impossible. Clearly, ‘conclusive
evidence’ that the Cabinet never met, or merely tossed a coin, can
56 Singapore Constitution, Article 12(1).
57 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 75.
58 [2001] 2 AC 50.
59 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 134.
60 Ibid. at 135. Note that a little over a year ago, he held a contrary view. See Yong Vui
Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 Singapore Law Review 192 para. 23 (‘Seeking
clemency is not only a natural thing for a condemned prisoner to do but also,
in the present case, a constitutional right given to any convicted person under
Art 22P of the Constitution.’).
61 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 139.
62 Ibid. at 83.
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only come from those present in Cabinet meetings. In the past, Cab-
inet Ministers and parliamentary secretaries were constitutionally re-
quired to take an oath affirming not to ‘directly or indirectly reveal the
business or proceedings of the Cabinet or the nature or contents of
any document communicated’ to the person concerned except ‘with
the authority of the Cabinet and to such extent as may be required for
the good management of the affairs of Singapore’.63 This, however,
was abolished in 2007.64 It would, though, be a mistake to presume
therefore that Cabinet Ministers are authorized to reveal the contents
of Cabinet proceedings. While the constitutional oath no longer
exists, under the Official Secrets Act 1985 it remains an offence for a
person to reveal, directly or indirectly, any information ‘to which he
has had access, owing to his position as a person who holds or has
held office under the Government’.65 This is clearly applicable with
respect to Cabinet Ministers. Thus, were a Minister to reveal that a
decision was taken on the basis of a coin toss, he or she would be in
breach of the law. Indeed, because of this legislation, an application
for judicial review on the ground that the decision relating to a par-
don was influenced by extraneous considerations will necessarily
require an unlawful act on the part of one or more current or former
Ministers. It is in this sense that CJ Chan’s proposed standard cannot
be legally achieved. Options are limited at this point: either the find-
ings must be revised, or the Pardon Case must be interpreted to have
impliedly read down relevant provisions of the Official Secrets Act
1985. The corollary of this is that the Act should now be deemed only
to protect information about the lawful conduct of Ministers. Conse-
quently, any disclosure of unlawful conduct will not constitute an
offence. If so, the Pardon Case is indeed a momentous one: for the first
time, legislation of the Singapore Parliament may have been impliedly
invalidated by the Court of Appeal.
IV. Conclusion
In the Pardon Case, the judges failed to correctly analyse the two
issues in question. The issue of discretion was fundamentally about
Singapore’s presidency and the ways in which it departs from the
Westminster model.  Instead of uncovering the institutional possibil-
ities of the new presidency, the judges interpreted it restrictively by
reading in certain Westminster axioms. Similarly, the Court’s analysis
of the issue of judicial review is inconsistent and falls under its own
63 Singapore Constitution, First Schedule §§4 & 4A (now repealed).
64 See Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 2007 (31 of 2007)
§10.
65 Cap. 213 (rev. edn 1985) §5. Public Prosecutor v Bridges Christopher [1998] 1
Singapore Law Review 162 (CA). For commentary, see Chan Wing Cheong,
‘Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act: Bridges and Beyond’ (1998) 38 Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies 260.
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weight. CJ Chan proposed standards of review that are, in effect,
legally impossible; either they must be revised, or they must be re-
interpreted in a way that would bring about a momentous change in
Singapore. The ultimate saving grace of the decision, however, may
lie in the fact that most of its findings are obiter in nature. Strictly
speaking, five of the six issues raised in the case did not call for a
lengthy analysis, because the appellant, the judges said, had failed to
meet the threshold of relief under the relevant legal rules. Yong re-
quested a ‘declaration’ that the discretion to finally grant or reject his
petition for clemency lay with the President. The Court of Appeal,
however, held that it had ‘no power to grant [the particular] relief’,66
for such declaratory reliefs were impermissible under the relevant
rules governing the proceedings.67 With the relief sought for having
been declared as being unavailable, all remaining issues were only of
academic interest. Indeed, the matter could have been disposed of in
one paragraph—precisely the amount of space that CJ Chan needed
to deal with the relief argument.68 For reasons best known to them,
the judges gave us the benefit of their analysis; however, for the
reasons stated in this paper, the merit of that analysis is not readily
clear.
66 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 25 (emphasis in the original).
67 Ibid. See Order 53 of the Rules of Court (cap. 322, R. 5, 2006 rev. edn).
68 See Yong Vui Kong, n. 1 above at 25.
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